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AAIA

Air Accident Investigation Authority

Fire/Smoke (Non-impact)

Serious Incident Investigation Final Report

Boeing 747-8KZF
Hong Kong International Airport
Hong Kong
29 March 2018

01-2020

Reader Advisory Information

Safety Investigations

The objective of a safety investigation is to identify and reduce safety-related risk.

The Air Accident Investigation Authority (AAIA) investigations determine and communicate the factors related to transport safety occurrences under investigation.

It is not a function of the AAIA to apportion blame or determine liability, while at the same time an investigation report must also include the factual material of sufficient weight to support the analysis, findings, and safety recommendations.

At all times the AAIA endeavours to balance the use of material that could imply adverse comment with the need to properly explain what happened, how and why, in a fair and unbiased manner.

This serious incident investigation final report contains information of an occurrence involving a Boeing 747-8KZF aircraft, registration JA18KZ, operated by the Nippon Cargo Airlines (NCA), which occurred on 29 March 2018.

The information contained in this final report is to inform the aviation industry and the travelling public of the general circumstances of the serious incident. This factual report supersedes all previous Preliminary report and Interim statements concerning this serious incident investigation.

The National Transportation Safety Board of the United States of America (NTSB), the Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB) and the aircraft operator assisted the Investigator-in-charge (IIC).

As serious incident investigation reports are public documents, this is a reader advisory to assist with the interpretation of the information for the public and to assist with following the sequence and chain of events covered in the factual information of the serious incident flight.

The chronology and event timeline concerning the history of the flight is linear. To assist with understanding the complex lines of information the descriptive text is supplemented where relevant with images, diagrams, and/or maps indicating the flight path and various critical or key information on the serious incident timeline with a reference to a map position, diagram or component location.

Conduct of the investigation was in accordance with Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and the Hong Kong Civil Aviation (Investigation of Accidents) Regulations (Cap. 448B).

The Air Accident Investigation Authority has compiled this report for the sole purpose of improving aviation safety.

Having established all of the relevant factors, this serious incident investigation final report will advise of the safety recommendations intended to prevent a reoccurrence.

The sole objective of the investigation of this serious incident is the prevention of accidents and incidents. It is not the purpose or intent of this safety investigation report to apportion blame or liability.

Chief Inspector

Air Accident Investigation Authority

Hong Kong

Synopsis

On 29 March 2018, the Nippon Cargo Airlines (NCA) Boeing 747-8KZF aircraft, registration JA18KZ, flight number NCA5207, operated from Narita International Airport, Japan (RJAA) to Hong Kong International Airport (VHHH). The aircraft was slightly ahead of the scheduled time of arrival (STA) at 0450 hours (UTC).

Just before touchdown at about 50 feet above ground at Runway 07L, “FIRE ENG 3” EICAS warning message appeared. The crew landed the aircraft and vacated Runway 07L to the intersection of Taxiway A8 and Taxiway A. The crew then informed ATC of the fire warning.

The first officer shut down the No.3 engine and discharged a fire extinguisher to it. The fire warning message went off afterwards. Airport Fire Contingent (AFC) arrived at the scene and found that a little white smoke was emitting from the No.3 engine. The aircraft was later cleared to taxi to cargo apron under the escort of AFC.

Subsequent ground inspections revealed thermal damage, sooting, and discolouration at the exterior top section of the No.3 engine core. The damage was due to a small fire caused by fuel leak from a cracked fuel manifold. The crack was not identified in the last ultrasonic inspection in January 2018.

The investigation was unable to establish why the crack was not detected. It was possible that the energy levels of the echoes reflected from the crack were attenuated to a level below the rejection threshold and the echoes were not interpreted as a possible crack. It was also possible that the intermittent signal from probe S/N 16F00EXC due to the frayed cable could have been an influence as well.

The investigation team has made one safety recommendation.

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1. FACTUAL INFORMATION

1.1. History of the Flight

On 29 March 2018, the Nippon Cargo Airlines (NCA) Boeing 747-8KZF aircraft, registration JA18KZ, flight number NCA5207, operated from Narita International Airport, Japan (RJAA) to Hong Kong International Airport (VHHH). The flight was slightly ahead of the scheduled time of arrival (STA) at 0450 hours (UTC).

The pilot-in-command (PIC) was the "pilot flying" in the left-hand seat, the first officer was the "pilot monitoring" in the right-hand seat, and the pilot sitting on the jump seat inside the cockpit was a relief pilot for the return leg to Japan.

Air Traffic Control (ATC) cleared the aircraft to land on Runway 07L at approximately 0435 hours. Just before touchdown, "FIRE ENG 3" EICAS warning message appeared. The PIC landed the aircraft at Runway 07L at 0436 hours, and stopped the aircraft using thrust reversers.

The aircraft vacated Runway 07L to the intersection of Taxiway A8 and Taxiway A.

The crew informed ATC that "we have a fire and we have to stop here". ATC activated the Crash Alarm to initiate a Ground Incident at 0437 hours. The first officer shut down the No.3 engine and activated the engine fire suppression.

The engine fire warning message cancelled following the extinguisher discharge.

Airport Fire Contingent (AFC) arrived at the scene at 0438 hours.

Upon arrival, AFC found that "a little white smoke was emitting from the No.3 engine of the aircraft". On request by AFC, the No.4 engine was shut down allowing the AFC to access the starboard side of the aircraft to conduct inspections including a temperature check on the No.3 engine.

At 0459 hours after the inspections, the crew restarted the No.4 engine. (See Figure 10 for a plot of selected flight data.)

Taxi clearance was given by ATC at 0503 hours. The aircraft then taxied to cargo apron bay C22 under the escort of AFC. After the aircraft was parked in the bay, the Ground Incident was stood down at 0518 hours.

1.2. Injuries to Persons

There were three pilots and two passengers on board the aircraft. There was no injury to any person involved in the flight or to any third party.

Injuries to Persons						
Persons on board:	Crew	3	Passengers	2	Others	0
Injuries	Crew	0	Passengers	0		

Table 1: Injuries to Persons

1.3. Damage - Aircraft

Subsequent ground inspections revealed thermal damage, sooting, and discolouration at the exterior top section of the No.3 engine core. The details are included in Section 1.12.

1.4. Other Damages

There was no other damage to objects other than the No.3 engine.

1.5. Personnel Information

1.5.1. Flight Crew

The PIC, the first officer and the relief pilot held valid licences and medical certificates.

The crew information is in Section 6.2.

1.5.2. Maintenance Personnel - Non-destructive Testing (NDT) Inspector

Qualification

In Japan, aerospace NDT inspectors are qualified in accordance with the official standards, such as the national standard, JIS aerospace standards JIS W0905 (Aerospace non-destructive inspection personnel qualification and certification), and the international standard, NAS410 : NAS Certification & Qualification of Non-destructive Test Personnel. JAL Engineering Co., Ltd. (JALEC) complies with NAS410 for certifying NDT inspectors' qualification.

The NDT inspector, who carried out the last two inspections on the No.3 engine in accordance with Service Bulletin (SB) 73-0034 Engine Fuel and Control - Fuel Nozzle Manifolds (73-11-40) - Fuel Manifold Field Inspection (see Section 1.6.5) issued by the engine manufacturer General Electric (GE), was granted by his employer JALEC a qualification of NAS-410 Ultrasonic Testing (UT) Level 3 valid until 31 October 2021.

Training on SB 73-0034

The NDT inspector attended an in-house and specialised GEnx-2B ENG Fuel Manifold Ultrasonic Inspection (USI) Practical Training on SB 73-0034 and the use of GE NDT kit FQAP-677 on 29 July 2014.

The instructor was another JALEC inspector who received the GEnx-2B Fuel Manifold Tube On-Wing Ultrasonic Inspection training on the SB conducted by a GE Aircraft Engines NDT expert on 20 May 2014.

The maintenance personnel information is in Section 6.2.4.

Shift and Attendance Records

The NDT inspector's attendance records from 1 to 12 January 2018 are as follows.

1st – 3rd	OFF
4th – 5th	Day Shift (8:30-17:22), no overtime.
6th – 8th	OFF
9th – 12th	Day Shift (8:30-17:22), no overtime.

Table 2: Roster of the Maintenance Personnel

1.6. Aircraft Information

1.6.1. Aircraft

The Boeing 747-8F aircraft, serial number 36141, was delivered to NCA in 2014. It is the freighter version of 747-8 with a wide-body layout and a two-crew glass cockpit. It is powered by four GEnx-2B67/P turbo-fan engines. The aircraft had valid Certificate of Registration and Certificate of Airworthiness. The aircraft details are in Section 6.3.

1.6.2. Engine

Basic Information

The GEnx-2B is a two spools variable-stator, high-bypass ratio axial flow turbofan engine of modular design and construction. It has counter rotating Low-Pressure (LP) and

High-Pressure (HP) rotors. The electronic engine control system is a Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC). The system controls the engine in response to thrust command inputs from the aircraft. It gives information to the aircraft for flight deck indication, maintenance reports, and engine condition monitoring.

Engine Hours

The No. 3 engine, serial number 959465, had accumulated 13,569 total hours and 2,551 total cycles.

1.6.3. Engine Fuel System

Fuel Distribution System

The fuel system supplies fuel to the engine for combustion and provides servo fuel to operate engine air system actuators and the fuel metering valve. The accessory gearbox drives a two-stage fuel pump, which supplies high-pressure fuel to the Fuel Metering Unit (FMU) through the fuel/oil heat exchangers. The Electronic Engine Control (EEC) sends a signal to the FMU, which controls the fuel to the Flow Splitter Valve (FSV). The FSV controls the quantity of fuel going into the 22 fuel nozzles via the Pilot Secondary Fuel Manifold (Psec), the Pilot Primary and Main Staged Fuel Manifold (Ppms), and the Primary and Main Unstaged Fuel Manifold (Ppmu), which are connected to all the fuel nozzles, 18 fuel nozzles, and 4 fuel nozzles respectively.



© Boeing. Reproduced with permission.

Figure 1: Fuel Distribution System

The Pilot Secondary (Psec) Fuel Manifold Segments

The Psec fuel manifold system for the GEnx-2B engine has two fuel manifold segments that wrap around the engine and supply fuel to the individual fuel nozzles. There are currently ten support features for these manifold segments, five for each of the top main and lower fuel manifold segments. There are also multiple fuel circuits (tubes) that are attached together to form each the top main fuel manifold and lower fuel manifold.



Figure 2: The Pilot Secondary Fuel Manifold Segments



Figure 3: Cross-Section View of the Mounting of the Fuel Tubes

1.6.4. EICAS System and Fire Protection

The Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) shows engine and sub-system indicators, system status data, and maintenance data, and gives a central crew alerting system. Dual-loop (redundant) fire and overheat detectors are provided at each engine. Fire and overheat warning indications include descriptive EICAS messages, master caution and warning lights, aural warning for fire and overheat conditions, fire handle and fuel control switch lights for engine fire condition, and Central Maintenance Computer (CMC) and EICAS messages to help maintenance, dispatch, and flight crews. Two fire extinguisher bottles are installed on each wing. Either bottle can be discharged to either engine installed on that wing.



Figure 4: Fire Warning Control Panels

1.6.5. General Electric (GE) Service Bulletin (SB) 73-0034

Purpose of the SB

Defects were found in the Psec fuel manifolds adjacent to the support blocks on the GEnx-2B engines, which could lead to fuel leaks during operation. The investigation identified that the fuel manifold support brackets do not allow sufficient clearance to account for thermal expansion and contraction in the fuel manifold system.

The SB was first introduced in June 2014 with Revision 04 being issued in September 2017. The latest version is at Revision 05 being issued in August 2018. The objective of the inspection is to make sure that there are no circumferential cracks in the two Psec fuel manifold segments wrapping around the GEnx-2B engine and supplying fuel to the individual fuel nozzles.

The SB provides the technique, equipment and procedure for conducting the on-engine ultrasonic inspection. GE recommends that operators do this SB before 1,000 engine cycles and repeat the inspection within 250 cycles. If a crack is found, the engine is to be removed and the fuel manifold removed from service to prevent fire caused by fuel leak.

Ultrasonic Inspection

Ultrasonic inspection is a non-destructive method in which beams of high frequency acoustic energy travel through a material until they strike an interface or discontinuity such as a flaw. Energy reflected from various interfaces and flaws can be used to define the presence and locations of flaws, the thickness of the material, and the depth of a flaw beneath a surface. The greater the amount of energy returning to the probe, the higher the signal on the screen. The height of the peak (echo) is roughly proportional to the area of the flaws.



Figure 5: Typical Flaw Detection by Ultrasonic Inspection

(Source: https://www.tec-science.com/material-science/material-testing/ultrasonic-testing-ut/)

Ultrasonic Inspection Kit

An ultrasonic inspection kit GE-FQAP-677 is required for the inspection. The kit includes two dedicated ultrasonic probes, P/N 389-085-151 and P/N 389-085-161, each containing 4 elements, and a calibration standard.

The probes are wrapped around and manually rotated on the fuel manifolds. They direct 70° shear waves toward the areas to be inspected. The P/N 389-085-151 probe is positioned on Psec clockwise (CW) side while the P/N 389-085-161 probe was on the counter-clockwise (CCW) side. Revision 03 of the SB introduced new P/N probes, namely P/N 00-010012 as alternative to P/N 389-085-151, and P/N 00-010013 to P/N 389-085-161.



Figure 6: Calibration Standard and Holder



Figure 7: Probe and Elements

Calibration of the Probes

The probes are calibrated to specific inspection range of echo and rejection level or reject threshold (represented by the green line in Figure 8). These settings were amended in the Revision 02 and Revision 04 of the SB. Revision 02 of the SB was issued to move the reject threshold from 40% to 60% due to two false manifold removals, the range of echo was not changed. Revision 04 of the SB reduced the range of echo to completely ignore indications from braze lack of fusion. The rejection level was moved back to 40% to increase inspection sensitivity.

The changes are summarised as follows.

Version	SB Rev Date	Range of Echo (Inspection Zone Gate) in Major Division	Rejection Level in % of Full Screen Height (FSH)
Revision 04	28-Sep-2017	4.5 - 7	40%
Revision 03	11-Oct-2016	4.5 - 9	60%
Revision 02	12-Sep-2014	4.5 - 9	60%
Revision 01	18-Aug-2014	4.5 - 9	40%
Original	23-Jun-2014	4.5 - 9	40%

Table 3: Version of SB Vs Inspection Criteria

Note: If an echo reflected from a flaw has an amplitude of 50% FSH, it will be classified a crack if the rejection level is 40% FSH, but ignored if the rejection level is 60% FSH.



Figure 8: Inspection Range of Echo and Reject Threshold

1.6.6. General Electric (GE) Service Bulletin (SB) 73-0038

SB 73-0038 Engine Fuel And Control - Fuel Nozzle Manifolds (73-11-40) - Introduction of New Fuel Manifold System Hardware was first introduced in May 2015 and the latest version is at Revision 02.

It provides new fuel manifold system hardware to address the above-mentioned fuel manifold cracking issue. Installation of the new hardware is a terminating action to the field inspection per SB 73-0034. With installation of this new hardware, there is no further need to perform ultrasonic inspection of the fuel manifolds.

The No.3 engine did not have SB 73-0038 incorporated by the time of this serious incident.

1.6.7. FAA Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2018-21-12

The FAA issued the AD on 4 January 2019 for certain General Electric Company (GE) GEnx-2B67, -2B67B, and -2B67/P turbofan engines, which requires removal from service of certain fuel manifolds at the next engine shop visit and their replacement with parts eligible for installation. The fuel manifolds to be removed from service are listed in SB 73-0038.

1.6.8. Maintenance History

Previous Scheduled Maintenance

The scheduled maintenance checks of the incident aircraft completed before the serious incident are listed below. There were no significant deferred defects recorded before the flight.

Last completion	Work Order	Task
19-Feb-2018	10091855	[Package] B747-8F A Check (1000 hr interval task)
26-Feb-2018	10091857	Visually check of engine 1, 2, 3, 4 and restore all engine control system EEC C2 faults.
26-Feb-2018	10091858	[Package] Check - Maintenance MSG of FMU
5-Mar-2018	10092676	Servicing - No.3 engine power door opening system pump
16-Mar-2018	10093136	One time inspection - Fan OGV extension panel on No.3 engine.
19-Mar-2018	10092885	Check all engine IDG oil level & filter pressure indicator position.

Table 4: Maintenance History

Previous SB Inspections

The first inspection in accordance with the SB on the No.3 engine was accomplished in April 2016. Up to the date of this serious incident, eight inspections were carried out. No cracking was reported in any of the inspections. The last three inspections were carried out at the following hours and cycles. The last two inspections were conducted by the same NDT inspector from JALEC.

Work Order	Date	SB Revision	Hours	Cycles
10083555	30-May-17	03	10907:01	2022
10086330	7-Sep-17	03	12050:31	2234
10090935	12-Jan-18	04	12864:49	2387

Table 5: The Last Three SB Inspections

The Ultrasonic Probes Used

The information of the ultrasonic probes used in the last two inspections is tabulated as follows.

Work Order	Date	SB Revision	Probe P/N (S/N) (CW Side)	Probe P/N (S/N) (CCW Side)
10086330	7-Sep-17	03	389-085-151 (16F00GYH)	389-085-161 (16F00EXC)
10090935	12-Jan-18	04	00-010012 (U1118F)	389-085-161 (16F00EXC)

Table 6: The Ultrasonic Probes Used in the Last Two Inspections

1.6.9. Maintenance and Calibration of the Probes

Probe P/N 389-085-161, S/N 16F00EXC was previously returned to the GE Aviation's Quality Technology Center (QTC) facility by the NCA's Maintenance Planning Department for repair or replacement due to in-service damage in March 2018. After the serious incident, inspection kit GE-FQAP-677 (S/N 017), which included probe P/N 00-010012, S/N U1118F, probe P/N 389-085-161, S/N 16F00EXC (previously repaired in March 2018), and the calibration standard UT-2237 with S/N F15-003, was returned to GE for a kit calibration in June 2018.

Probe S/N 16F00EXC, which was used in the last two inspections, calibrated properly and all four elements were functional and able to resolve the EDM Notch target in the calibration standard. No electrical noise or issues were observed during the calibration routine. However, when the probe cable was put under a small amount of strain, similar to as when being used on-wing, the response from the EDM Notch became intermittent when using the No.1 and No.2 elements. No electrical noise or issues were observed when using elements No.3 and No.4. Visual inspection under 10x revealed exposed copper wires where the cable was potted in the probe body.

1.7. Meteorological Factors

The meteorological aerodrome weather report for VHHH at 0430 hours indicated that the wind was from 50 degrees at 11 knots. The visibility was 10 kilometres and the runway condition was dry.

1.8. Navigation Aids

Ground-based navigation aids and aerodrome visual ground aids were not a factor in this serious incident.

1.9. Communications

The aircraft was equipped with VHF radio communication systems. All VHF radios were serviceable. All communications between Hong Kong ATC and the crew were recorded by Voice Recording System in the ATC System.

1.10. Aerodrome Information or Remote Accident Location

The information on the arrival and the destination aerodromes is listed in Section 6.4.

1.11. Flight Recorders

The Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) and the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) were undamaged and removed from the aircraft. The data was downloaded successfully from the two recorders.

The aircraft was equipped with an L3 2100-4045-22 ARINC 717 Flight Data Recording System, which includes an ARINC 747 digital flight data recorder with a recording capability of 512 words per second data frame for a minimum of 25 hours. An underwater locator beacon is attached to the DFDR.

The aircraft was equipped with an L3 2100-1025-22 ARINC 757 solid-state cockpit voice recorder with a capability up to 2 hours of high quality recording on all four channels. The CVR records the flight crew voices from the audio control panels and other sounds inside the flight compartment via the flight compartment area microphone.

1.12. Wreckage and Impact

The aircraft was not damaged except thermal damage observed between 12 o'clock and 2 o'clock positions (aft looking forward (ALF)) at the exterior of the No.3 engine core.

1.12.1. Left Hand Side (ALF)

Thermal damage was found at the Aft Fire Loop grommets at 11:30 to 12 o'clock position, and discoloration at the underside of the LH Thrust Link. In addition, sooting was noted in some locations forward of the manifold. Thermal distress on the fire loop grommets in the same clock position as the second upper braze block of the manifold were also observed. Melting of grommet material is an indication of temperatures in excess of approximately 510 degrees Celsius.



Photo 1: Thermal Damage on the Left Hand Side

Photo 2: Melted Grommet Materials

Photo 3: Close-up of the Melted Grommet Materials

1.12.2. **Right Hand Side**

Thermal damage was also found at the Aft Fire Loop grommets at 12 to 12:30 o'clock position and the applied RTV Seals on the High Pressure Turbine (HPT) Active Clearance Control (ACC) Cooling Ducts at 12 to 2 o'clock position. Discoloration was observed at the underside of the right hand Thrust Link.



Photo 4: Thermal Damage on the Right Hand Side

1.12.3. Fuel Manifold and Aft Engine Area

The red RTV applied on the HPT ACC Cooling duct couplings was found discoloured to white and grey at location between 12 and 2 o'clock. On the upper HPT ACC cooling duct, areas of sooting and no sooting were also observed.

Photo 5: Thermal Damage at Fuel Manifold and Aft Engine Area

1.13. Medical/Pathological Information

No medical or pathological investigations were conducted as a result of this occurrence, nor were they required.

1.14. Smoke, Fire, and Fumes

“FIRE ENG 3” EICAS warning message appeared just before touchdown. After the aircraft vacated Runway 07L to the intersection of Taxiway A8 and Taxiway A, the first officer shut down the No.3 engine and activated the engine fire suppression. The engine fire warning message cancelled following the extinguisher discharge.

Thermal damage, sooting, and discolouration were identified at the exterior top section of the No.3 engine core as described in Section 1.12. The damage was examined in details during the investigation at the engine manufacturer’s facilities GE Caledonian.

1.15. Survival Aspects

No search and evacuation were required as a result of this occurrence. AFC arrived at scene shortly after the aircraft stopped at the intersection of Taxiway A8 and Taxiway A and there were no signs of fire at that moment. Therefore, no investigations on the survival aspects were required.

1.16. Tests and Research

1.16.1. Tests carried out at GE Caledonian

With the top manifold (part number 2561M11G01) still installed, an air pressure leak check was conducted and soapy water was applied to identify the leak areas. In addition, the manifold was removed and placed in a water bath for pressure test with Nitrogen at 10 psi.

1.16.2. Metallurgical Investigation at GE Shanghai Metallurgical Laboratory

The manifold was later sent to GE’s material laboratory in Shanghai. The Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM) techniques were applied for extensive observation of fracture surface.

1.17. Organisation, Management, System Safety

1.17.1. JAL Engineering Co., Ltd. (JALEC)

JAL Engineering Co., Ltd. (JALEC) is the maintenance and engineering subsidiary of Japan Airlines Limited (JAL). In 2009, it was formed by the JAL Group by integrating the Maintenance Division of JAL International Co., Ltd (JALI) and four JAL Group maintenance companies (JAL Narita Aircraft Maintenance Co., Ltd., JAL Tokyo Aircraft Maintenance Co., Ltd., JAL Engine Technologies Co., Ltd. and JAL Aviation Technologies Co., Ltd.).

1.18. Additional Information

1.18.1. Other Previous Non-detection of Cracks during SB Inspections

There were three previous cases happened on engines of other operators. The information is tabulated as follows.

Case	Date	Engine Cycles (CSN)	SB Revision	Crack Location	Cycles after Last Inspection
1	18-Jul-2016	1717	02	Upper Block #2	151
2	28-July-2016	No fatigue analysis	02	--	--
3	21-Feb-2017	1284	03	1 o'clock position (ALF)	21

Table 7: Other Previous Non-detection of Cracks during SB Inspections

This serious incident was the first case of crack undetected in the accomplishment of Revision 04 of the SB.

1.19. Useful or Effective Investigation Techniques

Not applicable in this investigation.

2. Safety Analysis

The Safety Analysis provides a detailed discussion of the safety factors identified during the investigation, providing the evidence required to support the findings, contributing factors and the safety recommendations.

2.1. Introduction

Prior to landing, the No.3 engine experienced a fire alarm during the final approach. The post landing engineering inspection identified evidence of thermal damage between 12 and 2 o'clock positions of the fuel manifold area (ALF) and a crack on the upper fuel manifold adjacent to the second braze block. The safety analysis will examine the flight operations, the details of the crack and its formation, the last two UT inspection per SB 73-0034 before the serious incident occurred, and issues which might have affected the UT inspection results.

2.2. Flight Operations

According to the PIC, the flight was normal before the “FIRE ENG 3” EICAS warning message appeared. During the flight, the fuel distribution and the fuel flow of the engines were monitored by the crew. No fuel transfer between the tanks was required. The flight data confirmed the fuel status (see Appendix 9.1.) The aircraft landed in a normal way and the fire warning message went off after the crew discharged a fire bottle. The fire protection systems functioned as per design.

2.3. Damage Analysis

2.3.1. Air Pressure Check of the Manifold

During the investigation at GE Caledonian, with the top manifold (part number 2561M11G01) still installed, a 50 psi air pressure test leak check was conducted and soapy water was applied to the second upper braze block area. Isolated bubbles were observed from this area.



Figure 9: The Second Upper Braze Block

Photo 6: Isolated Bubbles from the Second Upper Braze Block Area

2.3.2. Nitrogen Pressure Check of the Manifold in Water Bath

The manifold was removed, placed in a water bath, and pressurised with Nitrogen at 10 psi. Blowing bubbles were noted at the same block area. It was confirmed that a crack existed on the Psec manifold at a location next to the second upper braze block.

Photo 7: Water Bath Nitrogen Pressure Check

2.3.3. Metallurgical Investigation of the Manifold

Scanning Electron Microscopy Analysis

The manifold was later sent to GE's material laboratory in Shanghai. The Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM) techniques were applied for extensive observation of the fracture surface of the crack for its initiation and the fatigue striations away from the initiation. Cracking was identified in the tube adjacent to the second upper braze block and it extended along the welding toe of the brazing joint.



Photo 8: Crack Adjacent to the Second Upper Braze Block

Examination of the fracture surface revealed that the crack had multiple initiation sites on the outside diameter (OD) side of the manifold. The fatigue crack extended through the thickness of the wall. Fuel leak was evident from the deposit left on the fracture surface, which was heavily oxidized. The fracture morphology was consistent with high stress low cycle fatigue propagation.



Photo 9: Fracture Surface

Fatigue Analysis

During the fatigue analysis, Energy Dispersive Spectroscopy (EDS) was performed on the fracture surface. It was confirmed that the spectrum was consistent with 321 stainless steel. The cut-up section through the crack origin showed that the crack propagated in transgranular mode and no microstructure anomaly could be found. The crack initiated

from the OD side and propagated through the ID side of the tube. The fracture morphology was consistent with crack propagation at high stress and low cycle fatigue (LCF). The striation density was estimated at multiple distances from the origin and the results were consistent with LCF propagation.

2.3.4. Crack Growth

According to the analysis of the striation density and the distance of the crack from the origin, the crack depths were estimated as follows.

Crack depth in inch	Engine cycles (CSN)
0.015*	2,189 (before the penultimate UT inspection at 2234 CSN)
0.021	2,387 (12 January 2018, the last UT inspection)
0.0344	2,551 (the occurrence of the incident)

** According to GE, 0.015 inch is the minimum UT detectable crack depth.*

Table 8: Estimated Crack Depths Vs Engine Cycles

There were two scheduled inspections per the SB before the serious incident occurred. The results of these inspections did not identify any cracks on the manifolds. According to GE, this was the first non-detection of cracks event with Revision 04 of the SB.

By comparing the metallurgy analysis results with the records of inspection by NCA, it was noticed that the crack was at least 0.015 inch at 2,189 CSN (the minimum UT detectable crack depth) before the penultimate inspection was conducted on 7 September 2017. When the last inspection was carried out on 12 January 2018, the crack depth was about 0.021 inch.

Work Order	Date	SB Revision	Engine Hours	Engine Cycles	Crack depth at cycles
10086330	7 Sep 17	Revision 03	12,050:31	2,234	0.015" at 2,189
10090935	12 Jan 18	Revision 04	12,864:49	2,387	0.021" at 2,387

Table 9: Estimated Crack Depths in the Last Two UT Inspections

2.3.5. Thermal Damage of the Engine

During the investigation at GE Caledonian, sooting and discolouration were identified at various locations of the engine. Soot is a brown or fine black powder and a product of incomplete combustion. It can be slightly sticky. In a fire event, soot may adhere to surfaces below 400 degrees Celsius but not above. The area of no soot on the HPT ACC cooling duct was a positive evidence suggesting that fire was present in this area, which was in the same clock position as the second upper braze block next to the crack identified on the Psec manifold.

It was probable that the leaking fuel was ignited from contact with the hot surface of the Combustion Diffuser Nozzle (CDN) case during landing when the under-cowl ventilation flows were low.

2.4. The Sensing Probes in the Last Two Inspections

Probe P/N 389-085-161, S/N 16F00EXC was used in the last two inspections (7 September 2017 and 12 January 2018). It was returned by NCA to GE for repair in March 2018 due to in-service damage. During the investigation, the inspection kit GE-FQAP-677 (S/N 017), containing this probe, was returned to GE for another calibration check. The probe calibrated properly and all four elements were functional and able to resolve the EDM notch target in the calibration standard. However, when the probe cable was put under a small

amount of strain, the response from the EDM Notch became intermittent when using the No.1 and No.2 elements. No electrical noise or issues were observed when using elements No.3 and No.4.

Prior to the inspection, each probe had to be calibrated to specific requirements in the SB. After the inspection, each probe had to be calibrated again. The results of the pre and post calibration had to be recorded in a calibration and inspection log. In the logs of the last two inspections, the inspection and calibration were recorded in details and they were acceptable. Since probe calibration is accomplished using a calibration standard, the calibration process is usually accomplished on a work bench. When the probe is being used during an inspection it is under the cowling and the probe cable is being pulled / twisted as probes are being position on the manifold.

2.5. Identification of Flaws

2.5.1. Changes in the Range of Echo and the Rejection Level

The inspection zone gate (range of echo) and the percentage of the full screen height (FSH) (rejection level) were 4.5 to 9 major divisions and 40 % respectively in the original version of the SB. The rejection level was changed to 60 % in Revision 02 of the SB, i.e. less stringent. The inspection zone gate was reduced to 4.5 to 7 major divisions and the rejection level was reduced back to 40% in Revision 04. This was a new combination of the two settings. Theoretically, the sensitivity of the inspection should become higher for the detection of crack.

2.5.2. Circumferential Scanning with Mechanical Rotation

For tube inspection, in order to provide a 100% volumetric coverage in circumferential direction, the transducer or acoustic mirror, which sometimes is attached to the probe to reflect the UT beam from transducer to the tube ID and back, should be mechanically rotated. The necessity of such a rotation might complicate the inspection system and decrease its reliability and sensitivity due to mechanical vibrations, radial shifts, possible jams, and so on.

2.5.3. Effects of Fuel in the Manifold on the Inspection Results

When an SB 73-0034 UT inspection is carried out on the fuel manifold, it is most likely that the fuel manifold will still have fuel in it. It is possible that the fuel in the manifold could have a damping effect on ultrasonic sound waves. According to GE, during the development of SB inspection procedures, they took into account of the fuel effect and validated the procedures on training engines without fuel and on-wing engines with fuel, including checking the use of the hollow calibration standard and accounting for variation in the inspection process due to having fuel or no fuel in manifold.

2.5.4. Echo Amplitude

For ultrasonic inspection, there might be situations that the energy of the reflection could be attenuated due to scattering, absorption, surface roughness and diffraction, etc. If the attenuation existed to an extent that the peak of an echo became less than the threshold (60% in Revision 03 and 40% in Revision 04), the echo might not be interpreted as a possible crack.

The penultimate inspection was performed in accordance with Revision 03 of the SB on 7 September 2017. For a crack with a depth between 0.015 inch and 0.021 inch, it was possible that the echo amplitude of the crack was below 60% FSH and not recognised as a crack.

An SB 73-0034 UT inspection was carried out on the incident manifold before it was cut up for metallurgical investigation. The echo amplitude was about 65% of FSH with a gain calibrated to 80% FSH (see Photo 10). For a through wall crack, it was expected that the

crack should yield a greater response than the responses shown in the photo. This could be attributed to the actual crack surface and orientation.

Photo 10: The Crack Indication before Metallurgical Investigation

2.6. Previous Non-detection of Cracks on Other Operators' Engines

There were three cases of non-detection of cracks in the inspection in accordance with Revision 02 (2) and Revision 03 (1) of the SB. Both versions of SB had an inspection zone gate (range of echo) and the full screen height (FSH, rejection level) of 4.5-9 major divisions and 60%.

In the first case happened in September 2016 (with SB at Revision 02 and rejection level at 60% of FSH), the crack was discovered due to wetness noted on the cowling latch access panel and the crack was traced to the upper fuel manifold Psec (P/N 2419M11G01, material 321 stainless steel). This happened 151 cycles after the last SB inspection.

The second case happened on another upper fuel manifold in July 2016 (with SB at Revision 02 and rejection level at 60% of FSH). No fatigue analysis was conducted but a hydrostatic pressure test confirmed a leak at the counter-clockwise side of the upper second braze block from the inlet end on the Psec manifold.

The third case happened in February 2017 (with SB at Revision 03 and rejection level at 60% of FSH). An operator experienced a fire alarm and overheat issue during flight. After landing, the engine was shut down in taxiway and fire extinguishing bottles were discharged. During engine wet motoring in the ground inspection, fuel leakage revealed on the Psec manifold (P/N 2561M11G01, material 321 stainless steel) at 1 o'clock position. Signs of thermal damage and sooting at the adjacent areas were noted. The event occurred only 21 cycles after last ultrasonic inspection performed on 4 February 2017.

2.7. Human Factors

The analysis of the conditions related to the previous SB inspections on the engine did not highlight skills based, decision making or perceptual errors.

Similarly, as the inspector was aware of the differences between Revision 03 and Revision 04, specifically the narrowed range of echo and the tightened rejection level in Revision 04, and that there was no indication (at or more than the threshold at 40%) at the inspected areas, routine and exceptional violations are excluded. There was no indication that inspector conducting the NDT was affected by fatigue during the inspection.

3. Conclusions

3.1. Findings

3.1.1 The maintenance records indicated that the aircraft was equipped and maintained in accordance with existing regulations and approved procedures.

3.1.2 The aircraft was airworthy when dispatched for the flight.

3.1.3 The flight crew members were licensed and qualified for the flight in accordance with existing regulations.

3.1.4 The flight data confirmed the trigger of a fire warning on the No.3 engine during the final approach.

3.1.5 The fire protection systems of the aircraft functioned as per design.

3.1.6 There was evidence of thermal damage on the No.3 engine.

3.1.7 A crack was confirmed on the upper Psec fuel manifold adjacent to the second braze block on the No.3 engine.

3.1.8 The last two SB 73-0034 ultrasonic inspections did not identify the crack in the Psec fuel manifold.

3.1.9 The results of the metallurgical investigation confirmed that the crack depth developed to a detectable size of 0.015 inch prior to the penultimate inspection and further to 0.021 inch when the last inspection was performed.

3.1.10 Probe S/N 16F00EXC was returned to the GE Aviation's Quality Technology Center (QTC) facility by the NCA's Maintenance Planning Department in March 2018 due to in-service damages. Probe S/N 16F00EXC was found with an intermittent signal on elements 1 and 2 when the probe cables were put under tension. It was similar to as when being used on-wing. This probe was used in the last two inspections.

3.1.11 Probe calibration is accomplished using a calibration standard, the calibration process is usually accomplished on a work bench. When the probe is being used during an inspection it is under the cowling and the probe cable is being pulled / twisted as probes are being positioned on the manifold unlike during the calibration checks.

3.1.12 The NDT inspector was qualified in accordance with existing regulations.

3.1.13 There was no evidence that the NDT inspector was affected by fatigue or other stress.

3.1.14 The non-detection of cracks identified in the investigation of this serious incident was the first one with Revision 04 of SB 73-0034.

3.1.15 There were three previous cases of non-detection of cracks for the SB, two for Revision 02 and one for Revision 03.

3.1.16 The non-detection of cracks in the last two UT inspections in accordance with the SB could be attributed to the actual crack surface and orientation as well as a damaged / degraded UT probe.

3.1.17 For ultrasonic inspection, it was possible that the energy of the reflection could be attenuated due to scattering, absorption, surface roughness and diffraction, etc.

3.2. Causes

3.2.1 There was a crack on the Psec fuel manifold adjacent to the second upper braze block. It was probable that the leaking fuel was ignited from contact with the hot

surface of the Combustion Diffuser Nozzle (CDN) case during landing when the under-cowl ventilation flows were low.

3.2.2 The crack was not detected in the last two UT inspections in accordance with Revision 03 (7 September 2017 inspection) and Revision 04 (12 January 2018 inspection) of SB 73-0034.

3.3. Contributing Factors

The non-detection of cracks in the last two UT inspections in accordance with the SB could be attributed to the actual crack surface and orientation. Other contributing factors could be the intermittent signals from probe S/N 16F00EXC and attenuation of the energy of the reflection due to scattering, absorption, surface roughness and diffraction, etc.

4. Safety Recommendations

4.1. Safety Recommendation 01-2020

To improve the reliability of the UT inspection, General Electric Service Bulletin SB73-0034 should be reviewed to verify the calibration, the range of echo and the rejection level are able to capture the full range and scope of the task.

Safety Recommendation Owner: General Electric

5. Additional Safety Issues

Whether or not the AAIA identifies safety issues in the course of an investigation, relevant organisations may proactively initiate safety action in order to reduce their safety risk.

The AAIA has been advised of the following proactive safety action in response to this occurrence.

5.1. Safety Actions Already Implemented

5.1.1. FAA

FAA issued AD 2018-21-12 - Installation Prohibition of certain fuel manifolds for GE GEnx-2B67, -2B67B, and -2B67/P turbo-fan engines on 30 November 2018. With effect from 4 January 2019, fuel manifolds, part numbers (P/Ns) 2419M11G01, 2561M11G01, or 2546M11G01, or lower fuel manifolds, P/Ns 2419M12G01, 2561M12G01, or 2546M12G01, are removed from service at the next engine shop visit.

5.1.2. GE

GE issued SB 73-0038 Engine Fuel and Control - Fuel Nozzle Manifolds (73-11-40) - Introduction of New Fuel Manifold System Hardware in May 2015. This SB provides new upper and lower manifolds with new support brackets and spring packs to permit additional movement of the manifolds during operation. Incorporation of this change will result in the termination of inspection as defined in GEnx-2B S/B 73-0034.

6. General Details

6.1. Occurrence Details

Date and time:	29 March 2018, 0435 hours (local time)	
Occurrence category:	Serious Incident	
Primary occurrence type:	Fire/smoke (Non-impact)	
Location:	Runway 07L, Hong Kong International Airport, Hong Kong	
	Latitude: 22°18'41.14"N	Longitude: 113°53'58.32"E

6.2. Pilot and Maintenance Personnel Information

6.2.1. Pilot-in-Command

Age:	53 years
Licence:	Japan Airline Transport Pilot's Licence, issued on 21 September 1999 (perpetual)
Aircraft ratings:	B747-400
Date of first issue of aircraft rating on type:	1 April 1998 (perpetual)
Instrument rating:	Perpetual
Medical certificate:	Class 1, valid to 22 January 2019
Date of last proficiency check on type:	16 January 2018
Date of last line check on type:	4 April 2017
Date of last emergency drills check:	10 July 2017
ICAO Language Proficiency:	Nil (An Aviation English Language Proficiency Certificate, No. 4298, was issued by Ministry of Land Infrastructure and Transport on 31 January 2008, indefinite validity.)
Limitation:	Corrective lenses are required
Flying Experience:	
Total all types:	11 064 hours
Total on type (747-8) :	1 587 hours
Total in last 90 days:	131 hours (From January to March 2018)
Total in last 30 days :	51 hours (March 2018)
Total in last 7 days:	11 hours
Total in last 24 hours:	3 hours
Duty Time:	

Day up to the incident flight (Hours:Mins) :	7 hours 21 minutes
Day prior to incident (Hours:Mins) :	7 hours 45 minutes

6.2.2. First Officer

Age:	38 years
Licence:	Japan Airline Transport Pilot's Licence, issued on 11 March 2014 (perpetual)
Aircraft ratings:	B747-400
Date of first issue of aircraft rating on type:	11 March 2014 (perpetual)
Instrument rating:	Perpetual
Medical certificate:	Class 1, valid to 6 April 2019
Date of last proficiency check on type:	16 January 2018
Date of last line check on type:	25 June 2017
Date of last emergency drills check:	17 August 2017
ICAO Language Proficiency:	Level 5 valid till 25 March 2020
Limitation:	Nil
Flying Experience:	
Total all types:	8 233 hours
Total on type (747-8) :	2 452 hours
Total in last 90 days:	137 hours
Total in last 30 days :	63 hours
Total in last 7 days:	17 hours
Total in last 24 hours:	3 hours
Duty Time:	
Day up to the incident flight (Hours:Mins) :	7 hours 21 minutes
Day prior to incident (Hours:Mins) :	0 hours 0 minutes

6.2.3. Relief Pilot (CAPM (second captain))

Age:	58 years
Licence:	Japan Airline Transport Pilot's Licence, issued on 16 November 2005 (perpetual)
Aircraft ratings:	B747-400
Date of first issue of aircraft rating on type:	14 December 2006 (perpetual)
Instrument rating:	Perpetual
Medical certificate:	Class 1, valid to 18 May 2018
Date of last proficiency check on type:	16 January 2018
Date of last line check on type:	28 March 2018
Date of last emergency drills check:	12 June 2017
ICAO Language Proficiency:	Nil (An Aviation English Language Proficiency Certificate, No. 3075, was issued by Ministry of Land Infrastructure and Transport on 22 January 2008, indefinite validity.)
Limitation:	Corrective lenses are required
Flying Experience:	
Total all types:	17 781 hours
Total on type (747-8) :	5 689 hours
Total in last 90 days:	134 hours (From January to March 2018)
Total in last 30 days :	47 hours (March 2018)
Total in last 7 days:	11 hours
Total in last 24 hours:	3 hours
Duty Time:	
Day up to the incident flight (Hours:Mins) :	7 hours 0 minutes
Day prior to incident (Hours:Mins) :	0 hours 0 minutes

6.2.4. Maintenance Personnel - Non-destructive Testing (NDT) Inspector

Age:	49 years
Date of Joining:	1990
Non Destructive Testing Personnel Certificate:	NAS-410, UT (Ultrasonics) Level 3, Valid to 31 October 2021 Others: ET (Eddy Current) Level 3 PT (Liquid Penetrant) Level 2 RT (Radiography) Level 2 MT (Magnetic Particle) Level 1
Non Destructive Testing Personnel Certificate Annual Confirmation Data:	UT Level 3, last done in October 2017 and April 2018
Specialised Training:	GEnx-2B ENG Fuel Manifold USI practical Training (in-house) on SB 73-0034* and GE KIT FQAP-677, received on 29 July 2014

*GE Service Bulletin 73-0034 - ENGINE FUEL AND CONTROL - Fuel Nozzle Manifolds (73-11-40) - Fuel Manifold Field Inspection

6.3. Aircraft Details

Manufacturer and model:	Boeing 747-8KZF	
Registration:	Japan, JA18KZ	
Aircraft Serial number:	36141	
Year of Manufacture	2014	
Engine	Four General Electric GEnx-2B67/P	
Engine Serial Number	959465	
Operator:	Nippon Cargo Airlines (NCA)	
Type of Operation:	Commercial Air Transport (Cargo)	
Certificate of Airworthiness	Issued on 24 October 2014 in Airplane, Transport Category and remains valid as long as the aircraft is maintained in accordance with NCA's continuing airworthiness maintenance program approved under Civil Aeronautics Law of Japan.	
Departure:	Narita International Airport	
Destination:	Hong Kong International Airport	
Maximum Take-off Weight	975,000 lbs	
Total Airframe Hours	13,569 hours	
Persons on board:	Crew – 03	Passengers – 02
Injuries:	Crew – 0	Passengers – 0
Aircraft damage:	Minor Damage	

6.4. Aerodrome Information

6.4.1. **Aerodrome of Departure**

Aerodrome Code	RJAA
Airport Name	Narita International Airport
Airport Address	Narita City, Chiba, Japan
Airport Authority	Narita International Airport Corporation
Air Navigation Services	Approach Control, Aerodrome Control, Ground Movement Control, Zone Control, Flight Information Service, Clearance Delivery Control, Automatic Terminal Information Service
Type of Traffic Permitted	IFR/VFR
Coordinates	35°45' 55" N, 140° 23' 8" E
Elevation	141 ft
Runway Length	16L/34R – 2,500 m

	16R/34L – 4,000 m
Runway Width	60 m
Stopway	197 ft
Azimuth	16L/34R, 16R/34L

6.4.2. **Aerodrome of Destination**

Aerodrome Code	VHHH
Airport Name	Hong Kong International Airport
Airport Address	Chek Lap Kok, Lantau Island
Airport Authority	Airport Authority Hong Kong
Air Navigation Services	Approach Control, Aerodrome Control, Ground Movement Control, Zone Control, Flight Information Service, Clearance Delivery Control, Automatic Terminal Information Service
Type of Traffic Permitted	IFR/VFR
Coordinates	22° 18' 32" N, 113° 54' 53" E
Elevation	28 ft
Runway Length	3,800 m
Runway Width	60 m
Stopway	Nil
Runway End Safety Area	240 m x 150 m
Azimuth	07L / 25R, 07R/ 25L
Category for Rescue and Fire Fighting Services	CAT 10

7. Abbreviations

ACC	Active clearance control
AD	Airworthiness Directive
AFC	Airport Fire Contingent
ALF	Aft looking forward
ARINC	Aeronautical Radio, Incorporated
ATC	Air Traffic Control
CAT	Category
CCW	Counter-clockwise
CDN	Combustor Diffuser Nozzle (section)
CMC	Central Maintenance Computer
CSN	Cycle since new
CVR	Cockpit Voice Recorder
CW	Clockwise
DFDAC	Digital Flight Data Acquisition Card
DFDR	Digital Flight Data Recorder
EDM	Electro-Discharge Machining
EDS	Energy Dispersive Spectroscopy
EEC	Electronic Engine Control
EICAS	Engine-Indicating and Crew-Alerting System
ENG	Engine
ET	Eddy Current Testing
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FADEC	Full Authority Digital Engine Control
FMU	Fuel Metering Unit
FSH	Full screen height
FSV	Flow Splitter Valve
GE	General Electric
HP	High-Pressure
HPT	High pressure turbine
ID	Inside diameter
IDG	Integrated Drive Generator
IFR	Instrument flight rules
JAL	Japan Airlines

JALEC	JAL Engineering Co., Ltd.
JIS	Japanese Industrial Standards
LCF	Low cycle fatigue
LP	Low-Pressure
MSG	Message
MT	Magnetic Particle Testing
NAS	National Aerospace Standard of United States
NCA	Nippon Cargo Airlines
NDT	Non-destructive testing
OD	Outside diameter
OGV	Outlet Guide Vane
PIC	Pilot-in-command
Ppms	Pilot Primary and Main Staged Fuel Manifold
Ppmu	Pilot Primary and Unstaged Fuel Manifold
Psec	Pilot Secondary Fuel Manifold
PT	Liquid Penetrant Testing
RJAA	ICAO code of Narita International Airport, Japan
RT	Radiographic Testing
SB	Service bulletin
SEM	Scanning Electron Microscopy
STA	Scheduled time of arrival
USI	Ultrasonic inspection
UT	Ultrasonic Testing
UTC	Coordinated Universal Time
VFR	Visual flight rules
VHHH	ICAO code of Hong Kong International Airport

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
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